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CERCLA Reauthorization and
Natural Resource Damage Recovery
ROBERT

L.

GLICKSMAN*

More than thirteen years ago, Congress enacted the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act (CERCLA)5 in an effort "to bring order to the array of
partly redundant, partly inadequate federal hazardous substances
cleanup and compensation laws." 2 The contentious debate that
has swirled around the second major reauthorization of the statute
bears witness to CERCLA's failure, thus far, to achieve that objective. 3 According to a wide variety of interests," both the
cleanup6 and the response cost reimbursement' mechanisms appear to be unsatisfactory, and the many proposals expected to surface during the reauthorization process are likely to focus on improving those aspects of CERCLA's implementation.
* Professor of Law, University of Kansas; J.D., 1977, Cornell Law School; M.A.,
1974, Harvard University; B.A., 1973, Union College.
- CERCLA §§ 101-175, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988).
' New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1040 (2d Cir. 1985) (quoting
FREDERICK ANDERSON, ET. AL., ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LAW AND POLICY 568

(1984)).
1 The first reauthorization took the form of the Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986).
' A "long roster of complaints" has been leveled against CERCLA: "that [it] is too
slow and too expensive; that it misdirects scarce public and private funds to site investigation or litigation rather than remediation; that the liability scheme is unfair; that the program focuses on hypothetical risks while ignoring real risks; that it lacks clear cleanup
standards; and that remedies are not sufficient or permanent enough-or that they are
gold-plated." James M. McElfish, Jr. & John Pendergrass, Learning from the States,
ENVT[. FORUM, Nov.-Dec. 1993, at 17.
' See, e.g., Richard T. Dewling, Clean Out the Cleanup Backlog, ENVTL. FORUM,
Sept.-Oct. 1993, at 32. "Against the backdrop of political and public rhetoric regarding the
stagnation of the Superfund program, there appears to be one fact that everyone has accepted-that the backlog of contaminated and unremediated hazardous waste sites keeps
growing." Id.
I See, e.g., Kathy Prosser, Resolve Problems Outside the Court Room, ENVTL. FoRUM, Sept.-Oct. 1993, at 36. CERCLA's "reliance on a single, outmoded, and unsuccessful
[T]he current Superfund
approach to cleanup has the program in a stranglehold . .
program still waste[s] too many resources on lawsuits and counter claims." Id.
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At least at this early juncture, far less attention has been
paid to the natural resource damage assessment and compensation
provisions of CERCLA. If familiarity indeed breeds contempt, it
is not surprising that it has been easier to detect the flaws of the
remediation and response cost reimbursement aspects of CERCLA than to evaluate the relatively untested natural resource
damage provisions. Restoration of damaged natural resources has
taken a back seat to cleanup of released hazardous substances,
and far more litigation has involved response cost reimbursement
than damage claims. The pace of natural resource damage litigation is already accelerating, however, and both federal and state
governments are likely to become even more aggressive in their
pursuit of damage recoveries in the near future. It is appropriate,
therefore, to suggest clarifications of statutory uncertainties and
corrections of selected aspects of CERCLA's natural resource
damage provisions.
I.

THE NATURAL RESOURCE DAMAGE PROVISIONS OF

CERCLA
CERCLA authorizes federal and state governments to act on
behalf of the public as trustees in assessing and recovering damages for injured, destroyed, or lost natural resources." Those trustees may seek to recover damages, including the costs of assessment, from the same four categories of potentially responsible
parties (PRPs) that are liable for response costs.8 Trustees must
devote damage recoveries to the restoration or replacement of the
damaged resources or to the acquisition of equivalent resources. 9
CERCLA requires the President, acting through officials designated in the National Contingency Plan,' 0 to issue damage assessment regulations." Trustees who conduct assessments in accordance with the regulations are entitled to a rebuttable
presumption in administrative or judicial proceedings to recover

7 CERCLA § 107(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(1) (1988). For a complete description
of the natural resource damage provisions of CERCLA, see Robert L. Glicksman, Pollution on the Federal Lands IV: Liability for Hazardous Waste Disposal, 12 UCLA J.
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y (forthcoming).
* See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(C).
* 42 U.S.C. § 9607(0(1).
,oThe contents of the National Contingency Plan are described in 42 U.S.C.
§ 9605(a). The Plan itself is located at 40 C.F.R. pt. 300 (1992).
" 42 U.S.C. § 9651(c)(1).
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damages from PRPs.' 2 The "presumption shifts the burden of
proof from the trustee to PRPs on the issue of the validity of the
assessment."'"
The Department of Interior issued the initial damage assessment regulations in 1986.11 In 1989, however, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Ohio v. Department
of Interiorinvalidated and remanded critical provisions of the regulations, holding that the agency had failed to give effect to Congress' preference for measuring damages by reference to restoration costs rather than to the use value of damaged resources. 15 In
March 1994, the Department issued revised final regulations on
remand, 16 more than eleven years after the the damage assessment regulations were supposed to go into effect. 7
The Department's delay in issuing valid damage assessment
regulations has impeded the operation of CERCLA's natural resource damage provisions. Lacking guidance on the appropriate
manner in which to conduct damage assessments, trustees have
shied away from pursuing damage recoveries. Few cases have
reached trial,'18 and the unavailability of final damage assessment
regulations has precluded trustees from taking advantage of the
statutory rebuttable presumption.
Despite these obstacles, federal and state trustees have begun
to file natural resource damage claims with increasing frequency.

" 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(2)(C). The presumption also applies in similar proceedings
conducted under the oil spill provision of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (1988 &
Supp. III 1991); see also 43 C.F.R. §§ 11.10-.11 (1992).
" Kerry E. Russell, A Research Guide to Natural Resource Damage Under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 26 LAND &
WATER L. REv. 403, 408 (1991).
1, 51 Fed. Reg. 27,725 (1986)(eodified at 43 C.F.R. § 11). The Department revised
the regulations after the 1986 amendments to CERCLA. 53 Fed. Reg. 5,166 (1988) (codified at 43 C.F.R. § !1).
"I Ohio v. United States Dept. of the Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 443-45 (D.C. Cir. 1989);
see also Colorado v. United States Dept. of the Interior, 880 F.2d 481, 490-91 (D.C. Cir.
1989).
59 Fed. Reg. 14,262 (1994).
'
'" See 42 U.S.C § 9651 (c)(1) (1988).
'8 E.g., In re Natural Gypsum Co., 24 Chem. Waste Lit. Rep. 848 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.
June 24, 1992); Idaho v. Southern Refrigerated Transp., Inc., No. 88-1279, 1991 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 1869 (D. Idaho Jan. 24, 1991); cf. Idaho v. Bunker Hill Co., 635 F. Supp.
665 (D. Idaho 1986) (holding that damages would be the lesser of the value and the cost of
restoration of the damaged resources). Bunker Hill conflicts with the decisions in Ohio v.
United States Dep't of the Interior, 880 F.2d 432 (D.C. Cir. 1989), and Colorado v.
United States Dep't of the Interior, 880 F.2d 481 (D.C. Cir. 1989). Therefore, Bunker Hill
is of doubtful validity. See also supra note 15 and accompanying text.
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The Department of Justice has negotiated consent decrees requiring payments for damaged resources, 19 resulting in substantial recoveries in some cases. Exxon's agreement to pay $900 million to
settle federal and state trustees' claims arising out of the oil spill
in Prince William Sound is the most prominent example.20 These
recoveries are bound to encourage trustees to file even more damage recovery actions.
II.

RECOMMENDED REVISIONS TO THE NATURAL RESOURCE
DAMAGE PROVISIONS

Because of the Department of Interior's delay in issuing
valid, final damage assessment regulations, it is difficult to assess
the effectiveness of CERCLA's natural resource damage provisions. That delay may support conflicting arguments that it is too
soon to amend the natural resource damage provisions or that
Congress should completely revise the damage recovery process.
On the one hand, recommendations for revisions to CERCLA's
natural resource damage provisions may appear to be premature.
The cases that have been litigated, however, have revealed statutory ambiguities and weaknesses that merit consideration in the
current reauthorization process.
On the other hand, the Department's belated issuance of
damage assessment regulations may indicate that the difficulties
of valuing damaged natural resources are insurmountable. If they
are, then an approach to providing compensation for injured natural resources that does not require individualized assessments may
be advisable. The statute already requires the Department to create standard procedures for simplified assessments requiring minimal field observations. 2 ' These Type A assessment procedures,
which currently apply to coastal and marine resources, are governed by the use of a computer model, the Natural Resource
Damage Assessment Model for Coastal and Marine Environ-

'
Lists of proposed and final consent decrees are published each month in the Recent
Developments section of the Environmental Law Institute's Environmental Law Reporter.
See also GEORGE C. COGGINS & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN. PUBLIC NATURAL RESOURCES
LAW § 11.05[8][a], at n.350 (Release # 7, 1994) (listing other decrees); see generally,
Utah v. Kennecott Corp., 801 F. Supp. 553 (D. Utah 1992) (rejecting a proposed consent
decree involving damages for contamination of state groundwater resources).

" See Water Pollution: Abuses Cited in Exxon Valdez Spending. Salmon Fisherman

End Blockade of Alaska Port, Env't Rep. (BNA) 781 (Aug. 27, 1993).
" CERCLA § 151(c)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9651(c) (1988).
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ments." If the Department proves to be incapable of devising feasible individualized assessment procedures, it may be possible to
apply similar models to a wider variety of resources and
ecosystems.
In my view, it is too soon to scrap the existing statutory structure. Although more than eleven years have passed since the initial statutory deadline for issuance of damage assessment regulations, the Department of Interior has finally issued its revised
damage assessment regulations.2" The four-year delay since issuance of the Ohio decision may indicate, not that a practical damage assessment process is impossible, but that the agency has
grappled seriously with the issues raised by the court and with the
comments submitted in response to the proposed regulations in an
attempt to avoid further crippling litigation." To scrap the current assessment and liability system now risks throwing out the
baby with the bath water. Selective and limited revisions, moreover, do not necessarily preclude more radical changes in the future if the system proves unwieldy.
Among the aspects of natural resource damage recovery in
need of clarification are those relating to the standards of liability

and causation. In the absence of clear legislative direction, the
courts have defined these standards in the context of response cost
recovery litigation. A PRP is jointly and severally liable for response costs unless it can demonstrate that the damages are apportionable, 5 although the courts have begun to diverge in their
application of the principles of joint and several liability. 6 Further, a PRP is liable for response costs even if the government is
unable to prove that it caused the release; proof of a causal connection between the release and the response costs incurred is
sufficient. 7
" 43 C.F.R. § 11.41(a) (1992).
13 59 Fed. Reg. 14,262 (1994).
" The Department of Interior reopened and extended the public comment period several times. See, e.g., 56 Fed. Reg. 30, 367 (1991), 58 Fed. Reg. 39, 328 & 45,877 (1993).
2 See, e.g., O'Neil v. Picillo, 883 F.2d 176, 178-79 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied sub.
nom. American Cyanamid Co. v. O'Neil, 493 U.S. 1071 (1990); United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 171-73 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1106 (1989).
2' See In re Bell Petroleum Serv, Inc. 3 F.3d 889, 901 (5th Cir. 1993) (describing
three different approaches to apportioning damages).
" See, e.g., City of New York v. Exxon Corp., 766 F. Supp. 177, 191-93 (S.D.N.Y.
1991); New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1044 (2d Cir. 1985).
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Although the legislative history appears to draw no distinction between the liability standard for response costs and natural
resource damages,"' commentators raise the possibility that the
courts will conclude that proportional responsibility governs natural resource damage liability. 9 The evidence is even stronger that
the courts will apply more demanding causation requirements in
damage cases than in response cost reimbursement litigation. In
the Montrose Chemical case,30 for example, the court stated that
the government would have to establish that a release of hazardous substances was the sole or a substantially contributing cause
of each alleged injury to natural resources. 3' In addition, the Ohio
court rejected an attack on provisions of the initial Department of
Interior damage assessment regulations, which required trustees
to satisfy a series of "acceptance criteria" as a prerequisite to establishing a causal link between a release and the injured resource.3 " The environmental petitioners claimed that these requirements were inconsistent with CERCLA's purpose of
liberalizing the traditional causation-of-injury standard. The
court, however, found the statute and its legislative history ambiguous on the issue of whether Congress intended to command a
standard of proof of causation of injury that was less rigorous
than the traditional common law approach in tort litigation. s The
court pointed out that Congress clearly modified traditional causation standards in the context of the causal relation between a PRP
and a hazardous substance release. It was, therefore, significant
that the legislature "fail[ed] to similarly alter the traditional rules
concerning the causal relation between a substance release and
the biological injuries alleged to have resulted from it." 34 Finding

"

See, e.g., 126 CONG. REC. 31,965 (1980) (statement of Rep. Florio, the sponsor of
CERCLA in the House of Representatives).
20 See Russell, supra note 13, at 413.

11 United States v.Montrose Chem. Co., 33 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1207 (C.D. Cal.
1991).
" Id. at 1208. Another court rejected this test in favor of one requiring proof that a
release was a contributing factor. In re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor, 722 F.
Supp. 893, 897 n.8 (D. Mass. 1989).
" Ohio v. United States Dep't of the Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 468-73 (citing 43 C.F.R.
§ 11.62(0(2) (1988)).
31 Id. at 470-71. See also id.at 470 ("The statutory text of CERCLA provides no

clues as to whether proof of [causation] should be less strict than that required by the

common law.").
4 Id. at 471.
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the Department's interpretation of the statutory causation requirement reasonable, the court deferred to it.35
Congress should erase any doubts concerning the liability and
causation standards for natural resource damage recovery by declaring that the same principles that govern response cost liability
also apply in actions for recovery of natural resource damages.
Plaintiffs in actions for natural resource damages face the same
difficulties in attributing injured resources to the wastes of a particular PRP that justify shifting the burden of proving apportionability to PRPs and dispensing with traditional causation principles in cost recovery actions. Indeed, in many cases the same
hazardous waste releases that require the expenditure of response
costs will result in natural resource impairment. The establishment of two sets of liability and causation standards applicable to
different aspects of the same release would be unnecessarily and
unjustifiably confusing.
Another area of uncertainty deals with the ability of local
governments to sue for natural resource damages. CERCLA defines natural resources to include "resources belonging to, man36
aged by, or otherwise controlled by state or local governments.
The statute also indicates, however, that natural resource damage
liability shall be to the federal or state governments,"7 and its definition of a state does not refer to localities." In two early cases,
the courts concluded that municipalities were appropriate natural
resource damage plaintiffs.3 9 Following the 1986 amendments to
CERCLA, the courts have barred localities from pursuing dam-

35 Id. at 470, 472-73. The issue in Ohio was the degree of proof of causation necessary
between a hazardous substance release and the injuries alleged to have resulted from it.
Although the court distinguished the issue of the required proof of a causal link between a
PRP's acts and the substance released, id. at 471 n.54, it is certainly possible that the
courts in natural resource damage cases will extend the more rigorous causation requirements to the latter context.
36 CERCLA § 101(16), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(16) (1988). In its revised final regulations,

the Interior Department noted but did not resolve the issue. See 59 Fed. Reg. 14,262,
14,268 (1994).
31 42 U.S.C. § 9607(0.
42 U.S.C. § 9601(27).

City of New York v. Exxon Corp., 633 F. Supp. 609, 616 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)(holding
prior approval from EPA is not required for action by city); Town of Boonton v. Drew
Chem. Corp., 621 F. Supp. 663 (D.N.J. 1985) (allowing a municipality to represent the

state for purposes of invoking CERCLA).
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age recoveries,'0 reasoning that municipalities have an alternative
means of protecting their interests-a city or county may request
that the state designate it as a natural resource trustee."1 Furthermore, these later decisions reflect the view that precluding local
governments from suing for damages prevents parochial local interests from affecting matters of statewide concern and avoids a
proliferation of inconsistent litigation strategy by counsel of variable quality and experience."2
Congress should use the current reauthorization process to
strike an appropriate balance between the interest of localities in
protecting resources primarily managed at that level of government, such as sources of municipal water supplies, and the legitimate concern that municipalities not be empowered to interfere
with matters of broader, statewide concern. The citizen suit provisions of CERCLA 3 and the other federal pollution control statutes provide a model for reconciling these potentially divergent interests. Congress should authorize localities to sue for damage to
resources which they consider to be locally controlled or managed.
A potential municipal plaintiff, however, would have to provide
prior notice to the state, which would have the opportunity to
forestall the suit. Congress could require the state to file its own
action in order to bar the local government from proceeding, or, if
it wanted to provide the state with more discretion, it could authorize the state to block suit simply by notifying the locality that
the resources at issue invoke broader interests that cannot be represented adequately at the local level." This solution would provide an efficient means of deciding on a case-by-case basis
whether the locus of concern for the injured resources is state or
local. It also would preserve local government input and participation in the process of protecting natural resources. This result is
consistent with the statutory provisions that seek to maximize
" See Mayor & Council of the Borough of Rockaway v. Klockner & Klockner, 811
F. Supp. 1039, 1047 (D.N.J. 1993); Town of Bedford v. Raytheon Corp., 755 F. Supp. 469

(D. Mass. 1991).
Town of Bedford v. Raytheon Co., 755 F. Supp. 469, 472 (D. Mass. 1991).
4 See id. at 473; see also Borough of Rockaway v. Klockner, 811 F. Supp. at 1047"

51.

42 U.S.C. § 9659.
citizen suit provision requires potential plaintiffs to provide sixty-days
prior notice to the President, to the state in which the alleged violation occurs, and to the
alleged violator. 42 U.S.C. § 9659(d)(2), (e). The statute bars the citizen suit if the federal government has commenced and is diligently prosecuting an action to require compliance atthe end of the prescribed notice period, id.
43

"'CERCLA's
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public participation opportunities 45 and could be part of an effort
to respond to charges that, despite these provisions, CERCLA
nevertheless freezes local communities out of important decisionmaking processes involving the fate of damaged resources.
A third area of uncertainty concerns the availability of attorneys' fees to prevailing parties in natural resource damages litigation. The courts have struggled with the authority of the courts to
award attorneys' fees in response cost recovery cases, especially in
suits by private parties. 46 The Tenth Circuit recently held that
while the American Rule bars a private party from recovering attorneys' fees arising from the litigation of a private cost recovery
action, nonlitigation attorneys' fees may be recoverable under
CERCLA as necessary response costs. 47 The circuit courts, however, are still deeply split on this issue.48 No case involving natural
resource damage recoveries has addressed the issue in any depth,
refused to award attorneys' fees for unexalthough one court
49
reasons.
plained
Congress should authorize the district courts to award attorneys' fees to prevailing or substantially prevailing parties in natural resource damage cases. It has authorized the courts to make
such awards under many of the judicial review and citizen suit
provisions of the federal pollution control laws,"0 including CER-

" See generally 42 U.S.C. § 9617; H.R. REP. No 253, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at
90 (1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 2872 (expressing the "strong opinion
that communities affected by Superfund sites will demonstrate much stronger support for
actions necessary to clean up those sites if the community is involved from the beginning in
determining the actions which will be necessary to complete the cleanup").
" See generally Kenneth A. Freeling, Recovery of Attorneys Fees in CERCLA Private-Party Cost Recovery Actions: Striking A Balance, 23 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
10,477 (1993).
,1 FMC Corp. v. Aero Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 842, 847-48 (10th Cir. 1993).
1 Compare Donahey v. Bogle, 987 F.2d 1250, 1256 (6th Cir. 1993) and General
Elec. Co. v. Litton Indus. Automation Sys., Inc., 920 F.2d 1415, 1422 (8th Cir. 1990),
cert. denied, Ill S.Ct. 1390 (1991) with FMC Corp. v. Acro Indus. Inc., 998 F.2d 842
(10th Cir. 1993); In re Hemingway Transport, Inc., 993 F.2d 915 (lst Cir. 1993) and
Stanton Rd. Assocs. v. Lohrey Enters., 984 F.2d 1015, 1018-19 (9th Cir. 1993).
,1 In Idaho v. Hanna Mining Co., 882 F.2d 392 (9th Cir. 1989), the Court stated only
that "CERCLA does not state whether attorneys' fees may be awarded for actions for
natural resource damages ... nor do any cases appear to resolve the question. We elect to
make no award of attorneys' fees." Id. at 396. The revised Interior Department rules again
are not dispositive. See 59 Fed. Reg. 14,262, 14,270 (1994).
0 See, e.g,, Clean Water Act §§ 505, 509, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1365(d), 1369(b)(3) (1988);
7
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act § 7002, 42 U.S.C. § 69 2(e) (1988); Clean Air
Act §§ 304, 307, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7604(d), 7607(0 (1988).
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CLA's citizen suit provision, 1 typically on the ground that fee
shifting is appropriate for litigants who vindicate important public
interests.5 2 By definition, a successful trustee in a natural resource
damage case has benefitted the public by providing the means of
restoring the resources it owns, manages, or controls on behalf of
the public. If fees are not available, complete restoration or replacement may not be possible because the amount awarded will
be reduced by the trustee's litigation costs. The inability to shift
fees to PRPs may be particularly troublesome in connection with
litigation concerning assessments performed prior to the Interior
Department's revised damage assessment regulations. That litigation is likely to be protracted because trustees will not be able to
take advantage of the statutory rebuttable presumption. Congress should avoid the possibility that the prospect of incurring
exorbitant legal fees will discourage trustees from initiating potentially meritorious damage actions.
In addition to clarifying the statutory provisions relating to
joint and several liability, causation, damage suits by municipalities, and the recoverability of attorneys' fees, Congress should bolster the mechanisms available to the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) to induce cooperation in the mitigation of natural
resource damages and eliminate an ill-conceived defense to natural resource damage liability. CERCLA authorizes the assessment
of punitive damages against any person who is liable for a release
or threat of release of a hazardous substance and who fails without sufficient cause to comply with an EPA order to assist in
remediation. The government may sue such a person for up to
three times the amount of cleanup costs attributable to the PRP's
lack of compliance. 4 Congress should extend punitive damage liability to PRPs whose lack of cooperation with mitigation efforts by

" CERCLA § 159(0, 42 U.S.C. § 9659(0 (1988).
" See COGGINS & GLCKSMAN, supra note 19, at § 7.05[1l. Cf. S. REP. NO. 414,
92nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3747 (acknowledging
that, "in bringing legitimate actions under [the citizen suit provision of the Clean Water
Act], citizens would be performing a public service and in such instances, the courts should
award costs of litigation to such party").
,1 The results in cases such as Idaho v. Southern Refrigerated Transp., Inc., No. 881279, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1869 (D. Idaho Jan. 24, 1991), are certain to encourage
PRPs to attack the validity of every conceivable aspect of trustee damage assessments. In
that case, the court concluded that, although existence value represents a legitimate component of natural resource damages, the studies which the state relied upon to support its
valuation of steelhead killed by a fungicide release were inadequate, id. at *55-*56.
' 42 U.S.C. § 9607(c)(3).
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EPA"5 or with restoration efforts by natural resource trustees increases the cost of restoring or replacing damaged resources. 56
The absence of such potential liability may encourage PRPs to
seek delays in the resolution of natural resource damage claims,
with a resulting increase in the risk of irreversible environmental
57

damage.
The defense that Congress should abandon relates to damages caused by pesticide applications. CERCLA prohibits recovery of damages resulting from the application of a pesticide product registered under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act (FIFRA).5 8 This exemption was presumably included to placate agricultural interests who were fearful that current pesticide application practices could result in substantial natural resource damage liability. The exemption is misguided for at
least two reasons. First, the adequacy of EPA's review of the potential adverse environmental effects of registered pesticides is
questionable. 59 Thus, the mere fact that EPA has registered a pesticide does not necessarily mean that its use is likely to be free of
adverse environmental consequences.60 Second, even if EPA's registration decisions were beyond reproach, a pesticide that, when
properly applied, will not create unreasonable adverse effects on

11 CERCLA authorizes EPA to take response measures necessary to protect the environment. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a). The statute also grants authority to EPA to take whatever
action, including the issuance of orders to private parties, is necessary toabate an imminent and substantial endangerment to the environment attributable to a release or
threatened release of hazardous substances. 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a). Failure to cooperate
with government-conducted remediation or to comply with EPA orders may result in avoidable damage to natural resources.
" Liability could equal some multiple of the difference between the costs incurred by
the government as a result of the noncompliance and the costs that would have been incurred had the PRP fully cooperated. The burden of proving this difference would be on
the government.
8"

See Bradley M, Marten & Cestjon L. McFarland, Litigating CERCLA Natural

Resource Damage Claims, 22 Env't Rep. (BNA) 670, 674 (July 19, 1991) (asserting that
PRPs lack adequate incentives to settle questionable damage claims in part as a result of
the unavailability of punitive damages).
58 FIFRA §§ 2 -31, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1988); see 42 U.S.C. § 9607(i).
9 See, e.g., 3 WILLIAM H. RODGERS. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: PESTICIDES AND Toxic
SUBSTANCES § 5.8, at 102 (1988) (discussing "management difficulties" in EPA's FIFRA
registration process).
" The Senate Committee on the Environment in 1980 cited "a substantial body of
evidence indicating that .. .damages to natural resources and food from pesticide releases
are widespread." S. REP. No.848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 45 (1980). It nevertheless recommended that failure to comply with FIFRA not provide a basis for invoking liability under
CERCLA for pesticide applications, id.
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the environment may cause considerable damage if misused. The
current exemption is analogous to providing an absolute defense to
common law nuisance liability for activities located in compliance
with local zoning laws, even if those activities are conducted negligently or recklessly. Congress should amend the exemption to impose liability on pesticide applicators who violate EPA application
requirements or whose conduct is actionable under state common
law or statutory requirements not preempted by FIFRA."
CONCLUSION

Although it is not yet possible to assess fully the utility of the
natural resource damage provisions of CERCLA, Congress should
not bypass an opportunity during the upcoming reauthorization
debate to resolve ambiguities and correct flaws that have already
appeared. To maximize the potential of natural resource damage
liability, to deter conduct that threatens serious if not irreparable
harm to valuable resources, and to facilitate the recovery of damaged resources, Congress should confirm that natural resource
damage liability is joint and several, that the same causation standard applicable in cost recovery actions also applies in damage
litigation, that local governments may sue for damages (at least
until the state precludes them from doing so), and that attorneys'
fees are available to successful plaintiffs in damage actions. In addition, Congress should authorize the courts to impose punitive
damages on PRPs who fail to cooperate with EPA or natural resource damage trustees. Finally, Congress should narrow the
scope of the exemption for pesticide applications so that PRPs
who apply those products improperly are not shielded from liability. Congress should reassess the need for more substantial
changes after trustees and courts have had a chance to implement
the Department of Interior's final damage assessment regulations
and after the impact of the statutory presumption in favor of

trustees who conduct assessments in compliance with those regulations has become clearer.
01For analysis of the scope of FIFRA's preemption of state law, see generally Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier, IlI S.Ct. 2476 (1991); King v. E.I. Dupont de
Nemours & Co., 996 F.2d 1346 (1st Cir. 1993); Papas v. Upjohn Co., 985 F.2d 516 (11 th

Cir. 1993), cert. denied sub noma.Papas v. Zoecon Corp., 114 S. Ct. 300 (1993); Worm v.
American Cyanamid Co., 5 F.3d 744 (4th Cir. 1993); Arkansas-Platte & Gulf Partnership
v. Van Waters & Rogers, Inc., 959 F.2d 158 (10th Cir. 1992), vacated and remanded for
reconsideration, 113 S. Ct. 314 (1992).

